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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 22/07/2011 Accident number: 788 
Accident time: 11:30 Accident Date: 09/09/2007 
Where it occurred: AF/2801/28745, 
MF040, Dragon Valley 
Village, Centre District, 
Bamyan Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: None 
ID original source: (28) Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 22/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [Demining 
group] ON SEPTEMBER 09, 2007  
INTRODUCTION  
An investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to 
investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a section leader from [Demining 
group] DT- 07. The accident occurred on 09 September 2007 at 11:30 hours in task # 
AF/2801/28745/MF040 located in Dragon Valley village, centre district of Bamyan province.   
SUMMARY 
The mentioned minefield is located on the top of a hill which was a fighting area between 
Mujahiddin and the government and mines were planted. Also the area was once again 
mined during the period of Taliban and the Northern alliance. 
[Demining group] DT-07 started clearance of the area on 16.06.2007. On September 09, 
2007 at 1130 hrs an accident happened on [the Victim] section leader of Section No.01 of the 
mentioned team while he was looking for stones to mark the cleared area. The accident 
happened on a portion of unclear area while he touched a stone. As a result of the accident 
he lost his left hand from the wrist and his right hand thumb. Also his right eye injured and he 
got a slight injury on his chest too. He received first aid by team medic in the site and was 
carried to Bamiyan civil hospital for further treatments. Then he was evacuated to Noor 
hospital in Kabul. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following points were found by investigation team: 
• The section leader had ignored the safety procedure by touching a stone in the 
unclear area, and as the stone might had been a booby trap, it had exploded and 
caused the amputation of his hand. 
• The section leader had not worn his PPE and visor which is a direct safety breach. 
• Poor command and control was a contributory factor for the happening of the 
accident, because the team leader of the mentioned team was on leave and the 
assistant team leader failed to avoid the section leader not to enter to unclear area. 
• The breaching of rule and standard by a member of command group could be a sign 
of motivation for other deminers not to work according to approved rules and 
regulations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following points are to be considered: 
• All deminers, section leaders, Assistant team leader and the team leader must use 
their PPE and the visor all the time while they are in the minefield. 
• Retraining of team command group is strongly recommended as they are responsible 
to maintain the approved standards and safety procedures. 
• [Demining group] management is advised to take appropriate actions for the 
improvement of team command and control related activities. Because the section 
leader himself who is responsible to control the deminers breached the safety 
procedure and no one stopped him. 
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• The team leader and Assistant team leader must strictly control the section leaders 
and deminers activities to make sure they are following the approved rules and 
regulations. 
• [Demining group] relevant field office is recommended to reinforce the internal QA 
visits of their demining teams, especially the teams working in remote provinces. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 977 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Chest; severe Eye 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Hand; Finger  
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "As a result of the accident he lost his left 
hand from the wrist and his right hand thumb. Also his right eye injured and he got a slight 
injury on his chest too". 
 
Analysis 
This accident is classed as Other despite the fact that the Victim may have been handling the 
mine at the time because the investigators did not state that he was. It is possible that the 
Victim was leaning out of the cleared lane to pick up a visible mine when the accident 
occurred. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim inattention because it seems that the 
Victim was leaning into the uncleared area to pick up a stone (to be used for marking) when 
he detonated a mine with his hand. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control 
Inadequacy because the victim was a field supervisor who was acting improperly and not 
wearing PPE when the accident occurred, and it is the group’s management who are 
responsible for the selection, training and control of their field supervisors. 
The use of stones for area marking in Afghanistan is normal, but lifting them from the 
uncleared area implies that enough prepared (painted) stones were not available, which 
would have been a Field control failing. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater 
responsibility. 
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